ARCHIVE // PS // TIME-SERIES
Economic overview
Gaza Strip — 33 years of data
Historical Values
| Year | Value |
|---|---|
| 1990 | Nearly half of the labor force of the Gaza Strip is employed across the border by Israeli industrial, construction, and agricultural enterprises, with worker transfer funds accounting for 40% of GNP in 1989. The once dominant agricultural sector now contributes only 13% to GNP, about the same as that of the construction sector, and industry accounts for 7%. Gaza depends upon Israel for 90% of its imports and as a market for 80% of its exports. Unrest in the territory in 1988-89 (intifadah) has r |
| 1991 | Nearly half the labor force of the Gaza Strip is employed across the border by Israeli industrial, construction, and agricultural enterprises, with worker transfer funds accounting for 46% of GNP in 1990. The once dominant agricultural sector now contributes only 13% to GNP, about the same as that of the construction sector, and industry accounts for 7%. Gaza depends upon Israel for 90% of its imports and as a market for 80% of its exports. Unrest in the territory in 1988-91 (intifadah) has rais |
| 1992 | In 1990 roughly 40% of Gaza Strip workers were employed across the border by Israeli industrial, construction, and agricultural enterprises, with worker remittances accounting for about one-third of GNP. The construction, agricultural, and industrial sectors account for about 15%, 12%, and 8% of GNP, respectively. Gaza depends upon Israel for some 90% of its external trade. Unrest in the territory in 1988-92 (intifadah) has raised unemployment and substantially lowered the standard of living of |
| 1993 | In 1990 roughly 40% of Gaza Strip workers were employed across the border by Israeli industrial, construction, and agricultural enterprises, with worker remittances accounting for about one-third of GNP. The construction, agricultural, and industrial sectors account for about 15%, 12%, and 8% of GNP, respectively. Gaza depends upon Israel for some 90% of its external trade. Unrest in the territory in 1988-93 (intifadah) has raised unemployment and substantially lowered the standard of living of |
| 1994 | In 1991 roughly 40% of Gaza Strip workers were employed across the border by Israeli industrial, construction, and agricultural enterprises, with worker remittances accounting for about one-third of GNP. The construction, agricultural, and industrial sectors account for about 18%, 16%, and 12% of GNP, respectively. Gaza depends upon Israel for nearly 90% of its external trade. Aggravating the impact of Israeli military administration, unrest in the territory since 1988 (intifadah) has raised une |
| 1995 | In 1991 roughly 40% of Gaza Strip workers were employed across the border by Israeli industrial, construction, and agricultural enterprises, with worker remittances supplementing GDP by roughly 50%. Gaza depends upon Israel for nearly 90% of its external trade. Aggravating the impact of Israeli military administration, unrest in the territory since 1988 (intifadah) has raised unemployment and lowered the standard of living of Gazans. The Persian Gulf crisis and its aftershocks also have dealt bl |
| 1996 | In 1991 roughly 40% of Gaza Strip workers were employed across the border by Israeli industrial, construction, and agricultural enterprises, with worker remittances supplementing GDP by roughly 50%. Gaza has depended upon Israel for nearly 90% of its external trade. Aggravating the impact of Israeli military administration, unrest in the territory from 1988 to 1993 (intifadah) raised unemployment and lowered the standard of living of Gazans. The Persian Gulf crisis and its aftershocks also dealt |
| 1997 | Economic progress in the Gaza Strip has been hampered by tight Israeli security restrictions. In 1991 roughly 40% of Gaza Strip workers were employed across the border by Israeli industrial, construction, and agricultural enterprises, with worker remittances supplementing GDP by roughly 50%. Gaza has depended upon Israel for nearly 90% of its external trade. The Persian Gulf crisis and its aftershocks has dealt blows to Gaza since August 1990. Worker remittances from the Gulf states have dropped |
| 1998 | Economic progress in the Gaza Strip has been hampered by tight Israeli security restrictions. In 1991 roughly 40% of Gaza Strip workers were employed across the border by Israeli industrial, construction, and agricultural enterprises, with worker remittances supplementing GDP by roughly 50%. Gaza has depended upon Israel for nearly 90% of its external trade. The Persian Gulf crisis and its aftershocks have dealt blows to Gaza since August 1990. Worker remittances from the Gulf states have droppe |
| 1999 | Economic conditions in the Gaza Strip?under the responsibility of the Palestinian Authority since the Cairo Agreement of May 1994--have deteriorated since the early 1990s. Real per capita GDP for the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) declined 36% between 1992 and 1996 owing to the combined effect of falling aggregate incomes and robust population growth. The downturn in economic activity was largely the result of Israeli closure policies--the imposition of generalized border closures in response t |
| 2000 | Economic conditions in the Gaza Strip - under the responsibility of the Palestinian Authority since the Cairo Agreement of May 1994 - have deteriorated since the early 1990s. Real per capita GDP for the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) declined 36% between 1992 and 1996 owing to the combined effect of falling aggregate incomes and robust population growth. The downturn in economic activity was largely the result of Israeli closure policies - the imposition of generalized border closures in respon |
| 2001 | Economic output in the Gaza Strip - which comes under the responsibility of the Palestinian Authority since the Cairo Agreement of May 1994 - declined perhaps one-third between 1992 and 1996. The downturn was largely the result of Israeli closure policies - the imposition of generalized border closures in response to security incidents in Israel - which disrupted previously established labor and commodity market relationships between Israel and the WBGS (West Bank and Gaza Strip). The most serio |
| 2002 | Economic output in the Gaza Strip - under the responsibility of the Palestinian Authority since the Cairo Agreement of May 1994 - declined by about one-third between 1992 and 1996. The downturn was largely the result of Israeli closure policies - the imposition of generalized border closures in response to security incidents in Israel - which disrupted previously established labor and commodity market relationships between Israel and the WBGS (West Bank and Gaza Strip). The most serious negative |
| 2003 | Economic output in the Gaza Strip - under the responsibility of the Palestinian Authority since the Cairo Agreement of May 1994 - declined by about one-third between 1992 and 1996. The downturn was largely the result of Israeli closure policies - the imposition of generalized border closures in response to security incidents in Israel - which disrupted previously established labor and commodity market relationships between Israel and the WBGS (West Bank and Gaza Strip). The most serious negative |
| 2004 | Economic output in the Gaza Strip - under the responsibility of the Palestinian Authority since the Cairo Agreement of May 1994 - declined by about one-third between 1992 and 1996. The downturn was largely the result of Israeli closure policies - the imposition of generalized border closures in response to security incidents in Israel - which disrupted previously established labor and commodity market relationships between Israel and the WBGS (West Bank and Gaza Strip). The most serious negative |
| 2005 | High population density, limited land access, and strict internal and external controls have kept economic conditions in the Gaza Strip - the smaller of the two areas under the Palestinian Authority - even more degraded than in the West Bank. An anticipated Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005 may offer some medium-term opportunities for economic growth. The beginning of the second intifadah in September 2000 sparked an economic downturn, largely the result of Israeli closure policies; |
| 2006 | High population density, limited land access, and strict internal and external controls have kept economic conditions in the Gaza Strip - the smaller of the two areas under the Palestinian Authority (PA)- even more degraded than in the West Bank. The beginning of the second intifadah in September 2000 sparked an economic downturn, largely the result of Israeli closure policies; these policies, which were imposed in response to security interests in Israel, disrupted labor and commodity relations |
| 2007 | High population density, limited land access, and strict internal and external security controls have kept economic conditions in the Gaza Strip - the smaller of the two areas under the Palestinian Authority (PA)- even more degraded than in the West Bank. The beginning of the second intifadah in September 2000 sparked an economic downturn, largely the result of Israeli closure policies; these policies, which were imposed to address security concerns in Israel, disrupted labor and trade access to |
| 2008 | High population density, limited land access, and strict internal and external security controls have kept economic conditions in the Gaza Strip - the smaller of the two areas under the Palestinian Authority (PA)- even more degraded than in the West Bank. The beginning of the second intifada in September 2000 sparked an economic downturn, largely the result of Israeli closure policies; these policies, which were imposed to address security concerns in Israel, disrupted labor and trade access to |
| 2009 | High population density, limited land access, and strict internal and external security controls have kept economic conditions in the Gaza Strip - the smaller of the two areas under the Palestinian Authority (PA) - even more degraded than in the West Bank. The beginning of the second intifada in September 2000 sparked an economic downturn, largely the result of Israeli closure policies; these policies, which were imposed to address security concerns in Israel, disrupted labor and trade access to |
| 2010 | High population density, limited land and sea access, continuing isolation, and strict internal and external security controls have degraded economic conditions in the Gaza Strip - the smaller of the two areas in the Palestinian Territories. Israeli-imposed crossings closures, which became more restrictive after HAMAS violently took over the territory in June 2007, and fighting between HAMAS and Israel during December 2008-January 2009, resulted in the near collapse of most of the private sector |
| 2011 | High population density, limited land and sea access, continuing isolation, and strict internal and external security controls have degraded economic conditions in the Gaza Strip - the smaller of the two areas in the Palestinian Territories. Israeli-imposed crossings closures, which became more restrictive after HAMAS violently took over the territory in June 2007, and fighting between HAMAS and Israel during December 2008-January 2009, resulted in the near collapse of most of the private sector |
| 2012 | Israeli security controls imposed since the end of the second intifada have degraded economic conditions in the Gaza Strip, the smaller of the two areas comprising the Palestinian territories. Israeli-imposed border closures, which became more restrictive after HAMAS seized control of the territory in June 2007, have resulted in high unemployment, elevated poverty rates, and sharp contraction of the private sector that had relied primarily on export markets. The population is reliant on governme |
| 2013 | Israeli security controls imposed since the end of the second intifada have degraded economic conditions in the Gaza Strip, the smaller of the two areas comprising the Palestinian territories. Israeli-imposed border closures, which became more restrictive after HAMAS seized control of the territory in June 2007, have resulted in high unemployment, elevated poverty rates, and a sharp contraction of the private sector that had relied primarily on export markets. The population depends on governmen |
| 2014 | Israeli security controls imposed since the end of the second intifada have degraded economic conditions in the Gaza Strip, the smaller of the two areas comprising the Palestinian territories. Israeli-imposed border closures, which became more restrictive after HAMAS seized control of the territory in June 2007, have resulted in high unemployment, elevated poverty rates, and a sharp contraction of the private sector that had relied primarily on export markets. Gazans increasingly turned to tunne |
| 2015 | Israeli security controls imposed since the end of the second intifada have degraded economic conditions in the Gaza Strip, the smaller of the two areas comprising the Palestinian territories. Israeli-imposed border closures, which became more restrictive after HAMAS seized control of the territory in June 2007, have resulted in high unemployment, elevated poverty rates, and a sharp contraction of the private sector that had relied primarily on export markets. Egyptian authorities began a crackd |
| 2016 | Israeli security measures and Israeli-Palestinian violence continue to degrade economic conditions in the Gaza Strip, the smaller of the two areas comprising the Palestinian territories. Israeli-imposed border controls became more restrictive after HAMAS seized control of the territory in June 2007. They have produced high unemployment, elevated poverty rates, and a sharp contraction of the private sector, which had relied primarily on export markets. | Egypt’s ongoing crackdown on the Gaza Stri |
| 2017 | Israeli security measures and Israeli-Palestinian violence continue to degrade economic conditions in the Gaza Strip, the smaller of the two areas comprising the Palestinian territories. Israeli-imposed border controls became more restrictive after HAMAS seized control of the territory in June 2007. They have produced high unemployment, elevated poverty rates, and a sharp contraction of the private sector, which had relied primarily on export markets. | Egypt’s ongoing crackdown on the Gaza Stri |
| 2018 | Movement and access restrictions, violent attacks, and the slow pace of post-conflict reconstruction continue to degrade economic conditions in the Gaza Strip, the smaller of the two areas comprising the Palestinian territories. Israeli controls became more restrictive after HAMAS seized control of the territory in June 2007. Under Hamas control, Gaza has suffered from rising unemployment, elevated poverty rates, and a sharp contraction of the private sector, which had relied primarily on export |
| 2019 | Movement and access restrictions, violent attacks, and the slow pace of post-conflict reconstruction continue to degrade economic conditions in the Gaza Strip, the smaller of the two areas comprising the Palestinian territories. Israeli controls became more restrictive after HAMAS seized control of the territory in June 2007. Under Hamas control, Gaza has suffered from rising unemployment, elevated poverty rates, and a sharp contraction of the private sector, which had relied primarily on export |
| 2020 | Movement and access restrictions, violent attacks, and the slow pace of post-conflict reconstruction continue to degrade economic conditions in the Gaza Strip, the smaller of the two areas comprising the Palestinian territories. Israeli controls became more restrictive after HAMAS seized control of the territory in June 2007. Under Hamas control, Gaza has suffered from rising unemployment, elevated poverty rates, and a sharp contraction of the private sector, which had relied primarily on export |
| 2021 | Movement and access restrictions, violent attacks, and the slow pace of post-conflict reconstruction continue to degrade economic conditions in the Gaza Strip, the smaller of the two areas comprising the Palestinian territories. Israeli controls became more restrictive after HAMAS seized control of the territory in June 2007. Under Hamas control, Gaza has suffered from rising unemployment, elevated poverty rates, and a sharp contraction of the private sector, which had relied primarily on export |
| 2022 | Movement and access restrictions, violent attacks, and the slow pace of post-conflict reconstruction continue to degrade economic conditions in the Gaza Strip, the smaller of the two areas comprising the Palestinian territories. Israeli controls became more restrictive after HAMAS seized control of the territory in June 2007. Under Hamas control, Gaza has suffered from rising unemployment, elevated poverty rates, and a sharp contraction of the private sector, which had relied primarily on export |